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Agriculture and Brexit Britain’s ‘No-deal’ Tariff Plans 
Alan Swinbank 
As this journal goes to press, the Brexit drama grumbles on. On 24 July 2019 
Boris Johnson displaced Theresa May as Prime Minister, sacked most of her 
cabinet, and declared his absolute determination that the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the UK) would leave the European Union 
(EU) on 31 October 2019, with or without a deal. Johnson did, in fact, negotiate a 
revised deal, which was endorsed by the European Council on 17 October. This 
consisted of the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by Mrs May, which provides 
for a transition (or standstill) period until the end of 2020. Appended is a revised 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, which would lock Northern Ireland into 
the EU’s Single Market for agri-food and other goods and, effectively, into its 
Customs union, for a further six year. In addition a Political Declaration asserts 
that the EU and the UK are resolved to negotiate ‘an ambitious, broad, deep and 
flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation with a 
comprehensive and balanced Free Trade Agreement at its core …’, during the 
transition period (GOV.UK, 2019c). There is though no guarantee that a Free 
Trade Agreement can be successfully negotiated. 
Two days later Johnson’s plans were thwarted by the UK’s House of Commons, 
which refused to approve the withdrawal package until the necessary legislation 
enacting the Withdrawal Agreement had been adopted into UK law. The 
European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-20 was introduced (House of 
Commons, 2019), but then left in limbo. How this latest impasse will be resolved 
is unclear at the time of writing: the EU has agreed an extension of the transition 
period to 31 January 2020, and the UK is embarked on a General Election on 12 
December. However, the purpose of this article is not to document these recent 
events, analyse the new package and its compatibility with WTO trade rules, or 
to second-guess future developments. Instead it reflects on one key proposal that 
had emerged during the course of 2019 that is still potentially in play: the tariffs 
the UK announced it would apply in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. 
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The UK had suggested that in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit it would sweep away 
border protection on agri-food products, in rather sharp contrast to the EU’s 
tariff regime for CAP (common agricultural policy) products, and despite 
mounting concern about the potential impact of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit on UK farmers. 
This article sets out to explore some of the political economy issues raised.  
Brexit Britain’s tariff barriers 
In July 2018 the UK notified the WTO of its draft Schedule of Commitments, 
including: the tariff bindings (i.e. maximum tariff rates) by which it considered it 
would be bound; the tariff rate quota (TRQ) commitments it felt obliged to 
assume; the level of amber box (trade-distorting) support to which it felt entitled 
(at €5.9 billion per annum); and — following the WTO Ministerial decisions at 
Nairobi in 2015 —  a commitment not to subsidise its agri-food exports (WTO, 
2019). (For an explanation of tariff bindings, TRQs, etc., see Box 1 in Swinbank, 
2017). The tariff bindings simply replicated those the UK had applied as an EU 
member state, giving other WTO Members little excuse to object to Brexit-
induced changes, but rather oddly leaving the UK with tariff bindings 
denominated in euros. Earlier the UK had committed to maintaining existing 
access arrangements for developing countries under both the EBA (Everything-
but-Arms) scheme for the least-developed countries and the GSP (Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences) for most other developing countries (Department for 
International Trade, 2017). 
WTO Members can, and often do, charge lower, applied, tariffs than the bound 
rates referred to above, provided they do so on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
basis. On 13 March 2019, with the initial date (29 March) for the UK’s exit from 
the EU approaching, the UK Government announced the temporary MFN tariffs it 
was planning to apply in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. These, of course, would 
be charged on imports from the EU. The regime would be temporary, and ‘would 
apply for up to 12 months while a full consultation and review on a permanent 
approach to tariffs is undertaken’ (GOV.UK, 2019a). In a further significant move 
the Government announced that imports from Ireland into Northern Ireland, 
provided they are not transhipped to the rest of the UK, would be tariff free. On 8 
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October 2019, after ‘further discussions with industry and consumer groups’, 
and ‘having listened carefully to their feedback’, this ‘no-deal’ tariff plan was 
updated (GOV.UK, 2019b). 
The ‘no-deal’ tariff plan was a radical and dramatic move, as the proposal was to 
abolish, or slash, most tariffs at a stroke: the Government said that 88 per cent of 
the UK’s imports by value would benefit from tariff-free access. The package was 
‘designed to minimise costs to business and consumers while protecting 
vulnerable industries’. Thus the exceptions (the remaining 12 per cent) included: 
—‘a mixture of tariffs and quotas on beef, lamb, pork, poultry and some 
dairy to support farmers and producers who have historically been 
protected through high EU tariffs’; 
— cars; but with duty-free imports of car parts ‘to prevent disruption to 
supply chains’; 
— tariffs to ‘help provide support for UK producers against unfair global 
trading practices’, on ceramics, fertilisers and fuel; 
— tariffs on ‘bananas, raw cane sugar, and certain kinds of fish’, to 
maintain ‘preferential access to the UK market for developing countries’ 
(UK.GOV, 2019a). 
A post-Brexit Britain would also retain tariffs on cloves and vanilla, cocoa paste 
and butterfat, crude palm and coconut oil, fresh beans, rice, and rum. For rice 
two additional, autonomous (i.e. not bound in the UK’s WTO Schedule), TRQs 
would be opened. For sugar — also of interest to developing countries —  there 
would be a new autonomous TRQ for raw cane sugar for refining, which would 
operate in addition to existing concessions. Whilst the MFN tariff on raw cane 
sugar for refining would be retained, the tariff on white (refined) sugar would be 
reduced by over 60 per cent. This looks like a delicate balancing act, trying to 
reconcile the rather different interests of Tate & Lyle Sugars, refining imported 
raw cane sugar, and British Sugar processing UK-grown sugar-beet, with 
Brazilian raw cane possibly displacing imports of EU white sugar from the 
market. 
For lamb the existing MFN tariff would apply unchanged, although New Zealand 
would continue to have free entry to the UK market through its current TRQ. For 
other meats, a complex array of cuts in the MFN tariff and new, autonomous, 
TRQs would be introduced. Thus, for example, Ireland could hope to continue 
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shipping some beef to the UK duty-free, although other suppliers that meet the 
UK’s sanitary requirements (e.g. Australia) could compete to supply within these 
TRQ concessions.  
The October 2019 update lowered the proposed ‘no-deal’ tariff on heavy goods 
vehicles, applied additional tariffs to some clothing items, and adjusted tariffs on 
bioethanol ‘to retain support for UK producers’. The Government now declared 
that its ‘no-deal’ tariffs ‘will mean lower prices in shops for consumers and the 
opportunity to source the best goods from around the world. For example, honey 
from New Zealand will see its tariff fall from 17% to zero, grapes from Brazil will 
reduce from around 15% to zero and other products, such as tennis rackets and 
wines will no longer face a tariff’ (UK.GOV, 2019b). 
On the date of the Government’s initial announcement the National Farmers’ 
Union (2019) published its own sober assessment of the tariff plan, treating it 
implicitly as a fait accompli. Later in the month the NFU and other UK farming 
unions in a letter to the Government wrote: ‘We are keen to work with 
government to have a better understanding of the economic modelling, 
assumptions and potential trade-offs that have been used in arriving at this 
point. However, the underlying point is that a no-deal exit from the EU would be 
disastrous for British farming and food production and should be avoided at all 
costs. In the meantime, as there is still the possibility of a no-deal exit, 
government must act now to address these concerns and revise the tariffs and 
quotas accordingly, to try and lessen the significant damage which a no-deal 
would inflict on the UK farming sector’. The farm-focussed journal Farmers 
Weekly covered the story in its issue of 15 March 2019 under the headline 
‘Tariffs mess shows government policy is ill-considered’, but there was no 
follow-up. Overall, there was little evidence of the outcry one might have 
expected from Copa-Cogeca (the main interest group representing EU farmers) 
had the EU made a similar unilateral move.  
The CAP’s tariff barriers  
The CAP has undergone a number of significant ‘reforms’ since its first 
incarnation. Despite modest tariff cuts in the Uruguay Round, one unchanged 
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feature of support for European agriculture is the prohibitively-high most-
favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs that are charged on a number of products 
(Swinbank, 2017). Although the EU indicated its willingness to countenance 
substantial cuts in border protection as part of a Single Undertaking (embracing 
the notion that nothing was agreed until everything had been agreed) in the 
stalled Doha Round, it has given no indication of its willingness to undertake 
unilateral cuts. A growing number of free trade agreements (FTAs), together 
with preferential access for developing countries, have partially opened the 
European market to cheaper agri-food imports. Moreover developed countries 
(Australia, New Zealand, the USA) also have access to limited import concessions 
through TRQs. In 2014 about 38 per cent by value of the EU’s imports of agri-
food products entered the EU under one of these preferential schemes 
(European Commission, 2015, Table 6). But attempts to extend these 
concessions weaken the protective effect of the EU’s non-preferential trade 
barriers, and incur the wrath of the European farm lobby. 
In June 2019, after two decades of negotiations, the EU agreed a FTA — yet to be 
ratified — with Mercosur, comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(European Commission, 2019). The agreement provides for GI (Geographical 
Indications) protection for 357 EU food and drink products in Mercosur, and 
easier access for some food and drink products. In return, Mercosur gains 
increased access to EU markets, subject to TRQs. Copa-Cogeca immediately 
expressed ‘deep regret’ over the ‘substantial concessions … made in the 
agricultural chapter especially regarding some of the EU’s most sensitive sectors, 
such as beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol, rice and orange juice …’ Given a ‘huge 
difference in production standards’, they claimed this would lead to ‘unfair 
competition for some key European production sectors, putting their viability at 
stake’ (Copa-Cogeca, 2019).  
Apart from showing deference to farming interests, why might trade negotiators 
be reluctant to embrace unilateral liberalisation? In the early years of the Doha 
Round, with a Single Undertaking its declared objective, an argument that 
carried particular weight was that to reduce farm tariffs unilaterally would 
needlessly cast aside a valuable negotiating ‘concession’ that might form part of 
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any ‘deal’ the EU could strike with countries seeking greater access to the EU’s 
protected food markets. How salient this still is in the multilateral context, with 
the Doha Round more-or-less moribund, is an open question. However, the 
proposed FTA with Mercosur suggests that in bilateral negotiations the 
argument still carries weight: in future FTA negotiations with Australia, New 
Zealand and the USA, for example, tariff concessions on agri-food products could 
be ‘traded’ for more liberal access for EU goods and services to their markets. 
And as illustrated by the UK’s ‘no-deal’ tariff schedule discussed earlier, another 
element in the political economy of the EU’s agri-food trade strategy is the claim 
that high MFN tariffs offer significant advantages to developing countries that 
have preferential access to the EU’s market, and that these benefits should be 
preserved in the longer term. 
Canadian reaction 
One ambition of Mrs May’s government was to roll-over the EU’s FTAs with 
countries around the world, so that the UK could continue to benefit from them. 
However, the announcement of its temporary ‘no-deal’ tariffs undercut the UK’s 
ambitions. As the then Secretary of State, Liam Fox, admitted, Canada was 
reluctant to roll-over the EU-Canada agreement, as Canada believed it would 
benefit from largely tariff-free access to the UK under the ‘no-deal’ tariff 
schedule. Without a rollover of the FTA, British products would no longer have 
preferential access to the Canadian market. But Fox suggested the Canadians 
were misguided, emphasising ‘that these are temporary tariffs’. If he had been a 
Canadian negotiator, he would want to lock into the market access advantages 
Canada currently enjoys on the British market for the longer term. 
WTO Considerations 
The plan to exempt exports from Ireland to Northern Ireland from import duties 
could be problematic, in that it seems to flout the WTO’s most-favoured-nation 
principle by giving products from one source more favourable treatment than 
other MFN supplies. When asked about WTO compliance, the Government 
responded it was ‘confident that the unique social, political and economic 
circumstances in Northern Ireland justify the temporary measures that the 
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Government is taking, based on existing exceptions under WTO rules’ (Written 
Question 238415, answered 8 April 2019). If ‘temporary’ really does mean ‘12 
months or less’, it may be that WTO Members will leave the measure 
unchallenged. If, in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, this measure is implemented, 
and ‘temporary’ begins to look more permanent, then a WTO challenge could be 
more likely. However, given the US-led embargo on replacing retired members of 
the Appellate Body, this may be an empty threat as the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement procedure could soon become inoperative.  
Exports to the EU 
The UK’s tariff plans for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit are not contingent upon a reciprocal 
response from the EU. British exports to EU27 would face the latter’s full MFN 
tariffs. In contrast to farmers’ muted response to the tariff plan, noted above, the 
potential impact on export sales caused considerable concern, particularly 
among lamb producers in Wales. (This was no surprise: the particular problems 
confronting sheep producers were highlighted by Feng et al., 2017). Thus, in the 
hustings to succeed Mrs May, Jeremy Hunt’s 10-point plan should he have 
become prime minister included a ‘No Deal Relief Programme’ that would 
‘include a £6bn fund for the fishing and farming sectors who export to Europe to 
ease transition out of the European Union.’ Six billion is an astonishing amount, 
although it is not clear whether this would have been additional money, or over 
how many years it would spread. For example, this can be compared to the UK’s 
claim for an annual €5.9 billion allowance for amber box support, or to the £3.3 
billion spent on CAP payments in the UK in 2018. Given this focus on the ‘fishing 
and farming sectors who export to Europe’, in what way would these payments 
differ from export subsidies that are no longer permissible under WTO rules? 
Mixed messages 
Recent developments send conflicting messages. Has the British Government’s 
‘no-deal’ tariff plan overturned the long-standing assumption that European 
farmers could successfully resist unilateral trade liberalisation, or is it simply the 
UK reasserting a consumer rather than producer orientation in farm policy? 
Whether a UK government would implement the ‘no-deal’ tariff plan was open to 
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question. Would implementation of the plan make it easier or harder to negotiate 
FTAs with countries around the world, and close trade links with the EU? If ‘no-
deal’ tariffs were to be implemented on a ‘temporary’ basis, how easy (politically 
and diplomatically) would it then be to reverse the deal and revert to the UK’s 
tariff bindings? Contrariwise, if one UK politician was willing to spend £6 billion 
to support farmers and fishers, does that imply that agricultural exceptionalism 
is still a potent political force in British politics? Deal or no-deal, these debates 
are likely to reverberate for years to come. 
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In March 2019 the UK government published details of the import tariffs it 
planned to apply in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit from the EU. Some 88 per cent 
of the UK’s imports — including many agri-food products — would enter tariff-
free. This proposed unilateral reduction in border protection promoted few 
protests from the UK’s farm lobby, in marked contrast to the reaction voiced by 
EU farmers to the planned trade agreement with Mercosur. Trade diplomats are 
often loath to contemplate unilateral tariff cuts, as these could later form a 
crucial part of a bargain in multilateral or bilateral trade deals. Indeed, the UK’s 
‘no-deal’ tariff plan could undermine its objective of concluding ambitious Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the likes of Australia and the USA. Despite these 
developments in agri-trade policy, UK politicians continued to express concern 
about the viability of UK agriculture in a ‘no-deal’ scenario, and some promised 
to lavish tax-payer-funded support on the sector. Thus both free (or freer) trade 
and agricultural exceptionalism were canvassed cheek by jowl.  
 
Pull-quote 
It was a radical and dramatic move, as the proposal was to abolish, or slash, most 
tariffs at a stroke 
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Text to Accompany Photo & Graphic 
Photo: Parliament Square, London, 19 October 2019 as Parliament sat and an 
estimated million people marched to demand a second referendum 
 
Graphic: Tariff infographic, reproduced with the permission of the National 
Farmers’ Union 
